Hong Kong’s Enforcement Dilemma: A Model of Tunneling
Project Description
This project explores how the legal rules in Hong Kong influence controlling shareholders’ incentives for tunneling – that is, implementing related party transactions to benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders.
Supervisor
HUA, Xinyu
Quota
1
Course type
UROP1000
Applicant's Roles
The applicant will collect and summarize the legal rules in Hong Kong that are relevant to related party transactions, and then develop and analyze a theoretical model to identify the impacts of these rules on controlling shareholders' behavior as well as its social welfare implications.
Applicant's Learning Objectives
- To develop a theoretical model of tunneling
- To analyze the impact of Hong Kong’s legal rules on tunneling incentives.
- To provide policy implications for reducing tunneling risks and protecting minority shareholders.
- To analyze the impact of Hong Kong’s legal rules on tunneling incentives.
- To provide policy implications for reducing tunneling risks and protecting minority shareholders.
Complexity of the project
Moderate